Center for Naturalism
Yes, they are serious. The scholars at the Center for Naturalism have a vision for all of our lives. We who are simply a connected chain physical causes, bound together by the laws of physics, a big blob of determinate matter, have much hope for the world the Naturalist will create for us!
FYI - Definition of Naturalism or popularly put by the late Dr. Carl Sagan - The Cosmos is all there is, all there ever was, all tha ever will be.
Straight from this site we find the following vision of the world:
Reminds me of a quote from GK Chesterton:
Out...
FYI - Definition of Naturalism or popularly put by the late Dr. Carl Sagan - The Cosmos is all there is, all there ever was, all tha ever will be.
Straight from this site we find the following vision of the world:
Naturalism as a guiding philosophy can help create a better world by illuminating more precisely the conditions under which individuals and societies flourish, and by providing a tangible, real basis for connection and community. It holds that doctrines and policies which assume the existence of a freely willing agent, and which therefore ignore the actual causes of behavior, are unfounded and counter-productive. To the extent to which we suppose persons act out of their uncaused free will, to that extent will we be blind to those factors which produce criminality and other social pathologies, or, on the positive side, the factors which make for well-adjusted, productive individuals and societies.
By holding that human behavior arises entirely within a causal context, naturalism also affects fundamental attitudes about ourselves and others. Naturalism undercuts retributive, punitive, and fawning attitudes based on the belief that human agents are first causes, as well other responses amplified by the supposition of free will, such as excessive pride, shame, and guilt. Since individuals are not, on a naturalistic understanding, the ultimate originators of their faults and virtues, they are not deserving, in the traditional metaphysical sense, of praise and blame. Although we will continue to feel gratitude and regret for the good and bad consequences of actions, understanding the full causal picture behind behavior shifts the focus of our emotional, reactive responses from the individual to the wider context. This change in attitudes lends support for social policies based on a fully causal view of human behavior.
Center for Naturalism Internet Site, accessed April 10th 2005. Emphasis Added.
Reminds me of a quote from GK Chesterton:
One ought to question the man who says he has the ability to "control environments to control the behavior of othersThe determinist does not believe in appealing to the will, but he does believe in changing the environment. He must not say to the sinner, “Go and sin no more,” because the sinner cannot help it. But he can put him in boiling oil; for boiling oil is an environment.
GK Chesterton, Orthodoxy (New York: NY, Image books, 1959) 20. Originally published: New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1908. Emphasis Added.
Out...
posted by Reid S. Monaghan at Sunday, April 10, 2005
12 Comments:
Reid quotes Chesterton:
"The determinist does not believe in appealing to the will, but he does believe in changing the environment. He must not say to the sinner, “Go and sin no more,” because the sinner cannot help it. But he can put him in boiling oil; for boiling oil is an environment."
Now Chesterton was correct in arguing that for the determinist, the key to behavioral change, was not to appeal to a mythical contra-causal free will but rather to effect such change by changing the environment of the person. No doubt plunging a "sinner" into boiling oil might be one way for effecting such change, but it's highly unlikely to be the most effective or the most desirable for doing this. Chesterton, so it would seem, had a very narrow notion of what determinists mean by the term "environment." Determinists, generally, hold to a much broader view. A person's environment encompasses not merely the physical surroundings of the individual but also, and usually more importantly, what we would call his social environment. That is the people around him with whom he interacts with. Very often, the most effective way for changing the behaviors of others (or ourselves) is to change the interactions that they have (or we have) with other people. From the standpoint, even the admonition to
"Go, and sin no more," can be seen as an attempt to alter that person's behavior through verbal reinforcement, which depending upon that person's genetic heritage and prior learning history, may or may not be an effective way of modifying that person's behavior.
Reid goes on to comment:
"One ought to question the man who says he has the ability to "control environments to control the behavior of others."
I would point out that the consistent determinist would also be interested in controlling environments in order to better control his own behavior as well. In fact the noted behavioral psychologist, B.F. Skinner, was very much interested in using the techniques of operant psychology in order to develop more effective methods for self-control. He devoted a full chapter of his book,
Science and Human Behavior to an analysis of self-control and how his operant psychology could be used for improving it.
Jim,
Thanks for the thoughtful reply. I in no way mean to imply that environment is irrelevant, but only that the determinist view is quite incomplete. In discussions with a philosphy professor who was trying to persuade me to "change my mind" about believing in God, I stopped him and asked this question: "For a materialistic determinist, my ideas are causally determined by the laws of physics, and not really my fault. Why are you so convinced I should (ie ought to) change" His answer was simple "well, they sandbag rivers when they do bad things". My point is this. If someone claims that another's beliefs, behaviors, etc. are "bad" "harmful" "irrational" and ought to change, does he then have the right to bring in his sand bags or his pot of boiling oil, or his benevolent dictatorship? This is to say nothing of the difficulty the materialist philosophy deals with as it smuggles in moral oughts to the discussion. The real issue is "who decides moral oughtness" and "when environments should be changed" and in what direction the changes are to be oriented. These are moral decisions - and those without moral authority (and who do not perhaps, even believe in any real objective morality) should be cautious to claim what others should or should not be permitted to do qua environment. You would rightly guess where i believe this authority resides and how it derives its strength in the human conscience - yes, even in the words "Go, and sin no more" - for I am a Theist who includes God in "our environment"
Thanks for the feedback...
And Reid in posting his thoughtful reply, relates a discussion that he once had with a philosophy professor. Reid recalls inquiring, "For a materialistic determinist, my ideas are causally determined by the laws of physics, and not really my fault. Why are you so convinced I should (ie ought to) change?" And he says that the professor responded, "well, they sandbag rivers when they do bad things". And that strikes me as being a good response since even if it is accepted that we are fully causally determined beings, we are not going to stop trying to alter each other's behaviors when we think that those behaviors might cause harm to others.
Reid, as I understand him, thinks that this position is problematic, that determinism undercuts anyone's claim to have the moral right to attempt to change anyone else's behavior. Indeed, Reid seems to think that determinism is incompatible with the existence of moral oughts.
Now the question of whether determinism and naturalism necessarily undercut the possibility of our having any tenable justifications for our moral practices is a difficult one. That issue is addressed by the CFN in some detail on their website.
Briefly, it seems to me that if determinism and naturalism are true then the question as to what right do we have to try to alter other people's environments (in order to alter their behaviors) does not arise (at least not in the sense that Reid seems to discussing here) simply because this is something that we cannot help ourselves from doing. Just as when rivers "do bad things," we go out and sandbag them to prevent them from doing harm, so when human beings do harm to others or threaten to do so, we are going to take measures to stop them. This response on our part is deeply rooted in our natures as biological creatures. Indeed, from an evolutionary standpoint, it seems most unlikely that we would be here, if our ancestors had not developed the capacity to respond to threats or potential threats in this manner. As CFN asserts:
"We are no more in a position to seriously question the moral values that underlie human flourishing (e.g., that murder is wrong unless in self-defense, that the young, elderly and weak deserve protection by the strong, that pain should not be needlessly inflicted) than we are to voluntarily cease breathing. Such values are directly linked to human survival, and as such don’t really need further justification."
Jim in his thoughful reply, bypasses the difficulty of natural explanations for prescriptive morality by simply claiming "we know we have to do something to stop harm when we see it" - To this I will just grant agreement. We should, and do alter situations we deem wrong. But here is the exact point where the naturalistic view of ethics fails most miserably.
Evolutionary ethics, the current explantation of naturalism, states that human animals have evolved certain morals due to the survivability benefits such behaviors provide. Altruism, for instance, is valued because of its value to our genes, our survival, but objectively is just one of many human emotions or values. The benefit of the value makes it moral, things are not objectively moral or immoral in essence. Evolutionary ethics describe current ethical behavior, but does nothing to prescribe why I ought to live that way (although some offer jail time as a good reason - though the virtous man does the right thing for the right reason).
Jim's answer to me seems to be that we "just act this way" and should not question the rightness or wrongness of our moral intuitions (or lack thereof) simply because we have developed these collectively over time as a species. Indeed he offers this quote:
"We are no more in a position to seriously question the moral values that underlie human flourishing (e.g., that murder is wrong unless in self-defense, that the young, elderly and weak deserve protection by the strong, that pain should not be needlessly inflicted) than we are to voluntarily cease breathing. Such values are directly linked to human survival, and as such don’t really need further justification."
But my objection to the relativity of survival ethics is that we know that we need to make moral changes in society. For instance, the majority of the western world, especially in America, thought African slavery to be acceptable. Yet, a minority of voices, brought change in a moral direction. Also, Nazi Germany, rejected the very certain ethics that Jim is quoting (that murder is wrong unless in self-defense, that the young, elderly and weak deserve protection by the strong, that pain should not be needlessly inflicted). Other human beings had to intervene to subdue this immoral society. This has been the case throughout human history; the moral law is brought to bear to correct evils and the moral oughts quoted have to be protected for these are the very issues in the debate. In fact all of these are debated today...one only thinks of the lack of the young, the weak in our day. The youngest of our kind are regularly eliminated in mass and now involuntary Euthanasia is on the rise in places where "voluntary" Euthanasia has been legalized.
Moral oughtness, prescriptive morality, is always brought upon the conscience from the very moral force of the moral law. It is not invented within societies, for societies invent all manner of things in the course of time. Some cultures have taught that is better to love their enemies, others have chosen to eat them. I think there is something beyond cultures and genes which tells each of us that we know better.
Additionally, to the failure of evolutionary ethics to provide moral oughts, it also fails to provide an adequate description for Supererogatory acts. Why should we praise those who sacrifice themselves for others, when there is no utilitarian or evolutionary value to the act. When the only reason is the moral value of the person involved.
It is also quite interesting that the evolutionary ethicist claims our morality is developed over long periods of time and therefor should be trusted, but then will join seditious attempts to have minority ethical opinions (such as gay marriage) over throw the sense of global ethical consensus. Why are they questioning some established morals and not others? What rule are they using to judge "good evolutionary ethics" form "bad" ones. Are they smuggling in something individually that they are not telling us about? There own moral rules?
A final syllogism is helpful in the discussion of naturalistic morality - and how theism better explains the moral universe. This is a classic Modus Tollens
P --> Q
not Q
tf not P
1. If God Does Not Exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
By objective, we mean right or wrong whether anyone believes it to be so or not. Even if the Nazis had won WWII and brainwashed everyone that the Holocuast was OK (for utilitarian or evolotionary reasons) it still would have been wrong.
Also, the task of atheistic moral realism - that morals are objective "just because" is very hard to sustain. Which btw, is why most naturalists are moral/cultural relativists
2. Objective Moral Values DO exist
Some things, are just wrong - boiling babies for fun is the gruesome example usually chosen by ethicists...and it is just wrong.
3. Therefore God Exists (or more precisely NOT (Not God))
Now how does "God" explain the moral universe. Classic Theism holds that God himself is the source of the morality (God in his nature is Goodness) and he expresses his nature to his creatures in the moral law. This is both expressed to the creature's conscience and in written expressions of the moral law such as the Ten Commandments, Christ's sermon on the mount. God's own unchanging good nature grounds objective moral law which then is applied to civil circumstances. I'll blog on this shortly...
So Jim and I will both bring out the sand bag on the mass murderer. But I do so for the murderer is committing moral evil - not simply violating the survival rules of our genes.
So I am thankful that Jim and I will join in the cuase of a good society - now I just ask him to protect the elderly, and those who cannot protect themselves. Even babies.
Actually, I am in agreement with Reid that a naturalistic ethic of the sort that attempts to deduce ought from is is not viable for pretty much the reasons that he states in his comments above. In fact Reid's argument is similar to the one that the British philosopher, G.E. Moore, gave in his critique of what he called the naturalist fallacy, which was BTW aimed primarily against the versions of evolutionary ethics that were current in his day. It also should be noted that Moore was an atheist who did believe in the existence of objective moral values, so he would presumably have had trouble with Reid's final syllogism because for him the nonexistence of God would not have necessarily implied the nonexistence of objective moral values.
More importantly for the purposes of the discussion here, I would contend that the same sort of argument that Reid invokes against naturalist ethics can also be invoked against a theological ethic as well. Reid, if I understand him correct, seems to be arguing that classic theism solves the problem of providing a foundation for morality by taking God as the foundation. God is the ultimate law giver. But that raises the old question as to whether something is right because God commands it or whether God commands it because it is right? If we opt for the latter, then the commandments of God cannot be the ultimate foundation for morality because there must exist a logically independent morality which we use to judge the rightness of God's commandments. If we opt for the former position then we risk reducing the proposition that 'God's commandments are right,' to a mere tautology.
A.J. Ayer, for example,in his book The Central Questions of Philosophy made that very point, first quoting from Bertrand Russell - "Theologians have always taught that God's decrees are good, and that this is not a mere tautology: it follows that goodness is logically independent of God's decrees." Ayer, himself, then went on to state that "The point that moral standards can never be justified merely by an appeal to authority, whether that authority is taken to be human or divine. There has to be the additional premiss that the person whose dictates we are to follow is good, or that what he commands is right, and this cannot be the mere tautology that he is what he is, or that he commands what he commands."
A.J. Ayer then went on to argue that morality cannot be grounded in metaphysics or in science or matters of fact. In this respect, he was simply recapitulating the arguments of both David Hume and G.E. Moore to the effect that ought cannot be reduced to is. Ayer then went on to argue that the is no real substantive difference between moral subjectivism and moral objectivism. However,in any case for Ayer, an appeal to God was incapable of resolving the issue of providing morality a foundation. And that leads me to make the suggestion that morality may not have a foundation as such and perhaps does not need one.
Jim,
Apologies for my delay in replay - I was out of the country for the a good part of May.
In his most recent post, Jim brings up an age old philosophical problem of the theistic grounding of ethics. I have treated the issue in a short paper which I will reference.
A Sensible Moral Realism
Jim, forgets that it is not tautological for someone to "be" the source of moral goodness and then decree that which accords to his nature. Now what the nature of this goodness (God) is available to us through conscience and revelation, indeed Jim agrees that we all "know" right from wrong...he even goes as far as to claim that this is without foundation. The point is that goodness exists ontologically prior to our apprehension of it - but to say that it does not exist, or there is not reason for moral reality, or moral oughtness makes a mockery of human moral experience. For we know that we should not "do evil and shun the good". Jim makes a good point following Ayer and Moore that "Ought" cannot be reduced to "IS" - but simply dismissing the prescriptive nature of ethics is not solution to explaining the reality of moral oughtness. It must be added that Ayer dismissed all metaphysics in his philosophy, instead choosing to cling to an epistemology which has no been widely and somewhat embarassingly repudiated.
I would briefly note that there have been atheists who are moral realists. G.E. Moore, who I have already mentioned, was one example, as represented in his book of a century ago, Principia Ethica. There are a number of contemporary atheists who are moral realists such as Michael Martin. See his paper, Atheism, Christian Theism, and Rape. Also see the other papers and debates involving Martin at theInternet Infidels website.
Professor Martin's paper, Atheism, Christian Theism, and Rape, seems particularly noteworthy because it directly takes on arguments similar to those that Reid presented in his paper, A Sensible Moral Realism.
Having pointed a couple of examples of atheists who are moral realists, I would also maintain that it is not necessarily so easy to dismiss the positions of philosophers like Bertrand Russell or A.J. Ayer who were not moral realists. In any case, it seems to me that Reid has set for himself a very difficult burden to meet. To make his case for the thesis, that a theistic moral realism can provide a grounding for morals, he must both show that the arguments of those philosophers who are subjectivists, noncognitivists, antifoundationalists etc. are either fallacious or inconclusive, and he must show that only a theistic moral realism is possible, that philosophers like Michael Martin or Roderick Firth, or Richard Boyd are mistaken in holding that moral realism can be sustained without reference to God.
Chesterton was mistaken. We determinists (or, in my case, non-free-will naturalists) constantly appeal to the "will", though not "free will".
As a psychotherapist I appeal to my clients' desires (their will) to be healthy and happy, to treat each other well, to enjoy life, to be generous, to look for and think about possible causes of and solutions to their troubles. I discourage their desires (will) to eat/drink/smoke too much, act entitled/bossy/nasty around others, to lie in bed and contemplate suicide. I'm a determinant in their lives, hopefully a significant one which will help them be happier. My "will" is a determinant in my life, and I constantly try to do good, to be happy, to eat right.
Ken B.
Ken,
Thanks for the reply. I understand that persons/agents apealing to others are part of the environment and certainly speech acts are influencial to people.
However, I think Chesterton was referring to something different. It is good that you are a factor in the lives of others encouraging them to "do good and shun the bad". Chesterton was referring to "why" one would consistently appeal to someone to do such a thing. Obviously he is using hyperbole to get at a point. In a naturalistic universe, materiialistic determinism is the logical entailment...so all we can do is create "environments" or "social constructs" for people are not in control nor responsible for what they do. This seems to be the aim of the Center for Naturalism. Read again the quote from their web site which favors a "fully causal view of human behavior." Chesterton would hold that people can make moral decisions and are not only products of their environments.
Additionally, determinists who claims to know what environments need to be created in order to create certain behavior in others, scare me. There was way too much of this thinking in the 20th century.
Additionally, I feel that naturalism is a philosophical failure in its attepts at ethical theory (hence the long running debate with Jim - smile) - it simply does not explain how "good" is grounded (which it must be for there to be a real difference between that which is bad). Simply giving unexplained synonyms does not suffice (ie good=pleasure or good=happiness or good=reasonable - this begs the question). It also fails (quite miserably) in explaining why anyone should act in an ethical way tomorrow. Perhaps, I can now live in this or that society doing whatever I want - and this will make ME happy, bring me pleasure, etc. Perhaps, like Nietzche, one thinks themselves "beyond" good and evil and does not desire to follow the "herd morality" around them. Now they risk jail, beatings, etc but they are not "wrong" to do so.
Usually the naturalist answer is to say why morals ARE what they are today (to aid in survival, social utiity, etc. Note that these are smuggling in the good again...ie survival=good society=good) but say nothing about why human beings ought to live morally. Jim's effort (following other philosophers like Moore and Ayer) is to just try and make the prescriptive nature of morality (moral oughtness) go away. To say it is not needed. This does not explain moral reality - for we know some things are wrong (objectively) and that we should not perform such actions.
You and I may both counsel our friends to do good, to be happy, and to eat right (though I sometimes have a weakness for ice cream). We may even tell them to do similar things as "good" (share with others, not be "nasty", tell the truth) - but the reasons we give that these things are good will most likely find different ground. I think we ought to be good to others, and this oughtness implies a moral duty. And the Universe does have one who is also interested in our doing what is good and shunning what is evil.
Thanks again for the post, it is helpful for me in understanding the determinist position more fully. And I hope we both do a good job at eating more brocoli and less ice cream...or maybe not.
Reid
In practice I don't believe naturalism has the problems you fear. I and my fellow naturalists believe in down-to-earth, common sense, observable notions like kindness, thoughtfulness, generosity, creativity, productivity, cooperation, democracy, the Golden Rule, etc. That's enough to build a lovely world.
Ken
Ken
I wonder if you haven't noticed that Reid on this very website features as one what he regards as "shaping books, John Piper's book, God's Passion for His Glory - Living The Vision of Jonathan Edwards. Surely, Reid must be aware that Jonathan Edwards, a leading Puritan divine of the 18th century who was also an eminent philosopher, was among other things a stauch defender of theological determinism, especially in his book Freedom of the Will. Edwards, as an orthodox Calvinist, followed Calvin in arguing that divine omniscience necessarily implies predestination, which was regarded as being inconsistent with contra-causal free will. Edwards, in his book though goes beyond simply reiterating the standard Calvinist arguments on the subject but also advances strong philosophical arguments against contra-causal free will as well. Ultimately, Edwards arrived at a kind of compatibilist position in which he attempted to show that human moral agency could be reconciled with theological determinism. (Also see the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy article on Edwards).
Although, Edwards was no naturalist, many of the philosophical arguments that he offered on behalf of determinism are of such a nature, that many naturalists could accept them. Edwards, among other things argued that the notion of contra-causal free will was incoherent, a position that most naturalists would embrace.
All this raises certain questions in my mind. Reid has already stated his opposition to determinism but he is apparently a great admirer of a theologian who was very much a determinist. Could it be that Reid is really closer to our own positions than he perhaps realizes or is willing to let on?
Jim,
Touche :) I was awaiting this post for some time. I almost included in my very first response to you that I do not hold to a version of freedom which is contra-causal. I acknowledge that I hold a view of freedom which we call compatibilism: See my original reply to you:
I in no way mean to imply that environment is irrelevant, but only that the determinist view is quite incomplete.
But let me demonstrate to you that we are still a ways apart for several reason. Naturalism holds that the universe is a closed system of cause and effect with absolutely no interaction from the outside (for their IS NO outside). Picture the universe as a box, there is nothing outside of this box in a naturalistic framework. In theism (even in Edwards version), there is one who wills very much from outside of the box. Even in theistic compatibilist views, human beings remain with real moral choices and real moral decisions, even if not contra-causal. Human beings also exist as beings which transcend the box as well so are not purely "Mechanistically determinded" although I do hold that God has a higher willing of things than we do.
Mechanistic determinism is fatalistic, and implies no teleology for our choices within the framework of Divine Providence. Spurgeon said it well:
What is fate? Fate is this – Whatever is, must be. But there is a difference between that and Providence. Providence says, Whatever God ordains, must be; but the wisdom of God never ordains anything without a purpose. Everything in this world is working for some great end. Fate does not say that. . . . There is all the difference between fate and Providence that there is between a man with good eyes and a blind man.
Naturalism is a world of blindness, theism is a world with eyes...
Now I will grant that Chesterton held to contra-causal free will, but his quote is still valid. Even an theological determinist like Edwards would appeal to the will and ask them to "go and sin no more" - and as you and Ken have done well to explain - some Naturalists/determinists would do the same. I would say however, that Naturalism completely fails to account for this moral interaction in this moral universe. So I am glad that we maintain that we will all exhort others towards "the good", but my conviction is that Naturalism does not have the account from which to withdraw these funds. In fact, Nietzche was perhaps the most consistent naturalist I have read - and he saw quite clearly that morals in a closed box naturalistic universe are reduced to the opinions on the herd, and worse, the will to power. And without an actual referent in speaking of the "good" - a naturalist of Stalin or Mao's version - who do not have the framework that we do of a Christian ethic, will do that which pleases then in achieving whatever "end" they deem best for other men - which is what I have great concern about.
But please consider me an ally in the exhortation of others to: love justice, mercy, goodness, and all manner of virtue. We can be friends here.
But let me just say that as a Naturalist, as one who claims to be in a closed box, that there is no reason to believe in God, that you are denying what you know (Romans 1) This, I would say puts you in a position of need for mercy from your Creator, and I hope that you come to your senses and acknowledge Him...for in Him there is forgiveness, life and joy.
At this point, I would recommend to you a book that may help in your questioning - The Question of God - CS Lewis and Sigmuend Freud Discuss God, Sex, and the Meaning of Life by Dr. Armand M. Nicholi, Jr. (Ken, this guy is a Clinical Psychologist at Harvard Medical School, you may have heard of this work)
If you choose to acknowledge that there is a God, as Anthony Flew has recently done, then we can enter all sorts of fun theological discussions on the nature and will of God - such as differences between Edwards and Chesterton - but such are intramural debates :)
Take care
Reid
Post a Comment
Links to this post:
Create a Link
<< Home